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NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS

1
2

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on June 4, 2021, at 9:30 a.m., or as soon thereafter as the

3

motion may be heard in Courtroom F, 15th Floor of the San Francisco Courthouse, located at 450

4

Golden Gate Avenue, San Francisco, CA 94102, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

5

12(b)(6), Defendant Twitter, Inc. (“Twitter”) will and hereby does move to dismiss the causes of

6

action in Plaintiff John Doe’s (“Plaintiff”) Complaint filed on January 20, 2021 (ECF No. 1) (the

7

“Complaint”). This motion is based on this Notice of Motion and Motion, the accompanying

8

Memorandum of Points and Authorities, the pleadings on file in this matter, oral argument of

9

counsel, and such other materials and argument as may be presented in connection with the hearing

10

of the motion.
STATEMENT OF RELIEF SOUGHT

11
12
13

Twitter respectfully seeks an order dismissing the Complaint’s causes of action with
prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES TO BE DECIDED

14
15
16
17

1.

Whether Twitter is entitled to immunity from all of Plaintiff’s claims under Section

230 of the Communications Decency Act (“CDA § 230”), 47 U.S.C. § 230.
2.

Whether the Complaint fails to state a claim for violation of 18 U.S.C. §1595, 18

18

U.S.C. § 2258A, California products liability, negligence, gross negligence, negligence per se, and

19

negligent infliction of emotional distress, and under Cal. Civ. Code § 1708.85.

20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
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1

I.

INTRODUCTION

2

Plaintiff John Doe appears to have suffered appallingly at the hands of unknown individuals

3

(“Perpetrators”), who tricked and manipulated him into making and sharing explicit pictures and

4

videos of himself and another individual in 2017 when he was a minor. But this case ultimately

5

does not seek to hold those Perpetrators accountable for the suffering they inflicted on Plaintiff.

6

Rather, this case seeks to hold Twitter liable because a compilation of that explicit video content

7

(the “Videos”) was—years later—posted by others on Twitter’s platform and although Twitter did

8

remove the content, it allegedly did not act quickly enough. Twitter recognizes that, regrettably,

9

Plaintiff is not alone in suffering this kind of exploitation by such perpetrators on the Internet. For

10

this reason, Twitter is deeply committed to combating child sexual exploitation (“CSE”) content

11

on its platform. And while Twitter strives to prevent the proliferation of CSE, it is not infallible.

12

But, mistakes or delays do not make Twitter a knowing participant in a sex trafficking venture as

13

Plaintiff here has alleged. Plaintiff does not (and cannot) allege, as he must, that Twitter ever had

14

any actual connection to these Perpetrators or took any part in their crimes. Thus, even accepting

15

all of Plaintiff’s allegations as true, there is no legal basis for holding Twitter liable for the

16

Perpetrators’ despicable acts.

17

Twitter has zero tolerance for CSE content on its platform. Twitter vigorously combats

18

CSE through a combination of methods, including review of user reports and the use of proprietary

19

technology to proactively identify and remove such material. During the six-month period from

20

January to June 2020, Twitter suspended 438,809 accounts for violating its policies prohibiting

21

CSE material, and proactively identified approximately 399,316 of those accounts using its own

22

technological means. However, given the sheer volume of Tweets posted every day on Twitter’s

23

platform (hundreds of millions of Tweets posted by over 190 million daily users), it is simply not

24

possible for Twitter—or the humans who enforce its Rules and policies—to remove all offending

25

content immediately or accurately in all cases.

26

Congress recognized the inherent challenges of large-scale, global content moderation for

27

platforms, including the potential for liability based on a platform’s alleged “knowledge” of

28

offensive content if it chose to try to screen out that material but was unable to root out all of it.
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1

Hoping to encourage platforms to engage in moderation of offensive content without risking

2

incurring potentially ruinous legal costs, in 1996 Congress enacted Section 230 of the

3

Communications Decency Act (“CDA § 230”), granting platforms like Twitter broad immunity

4

from legal claims arising out of failure to remove content. Given that Twitter’s alleged liability

5

here rests on its failure to remove content from its platform, dismissal of the Complaint with

6

prejudice is warranted on this ground alone.

7

While Congress has provided for very narrow exceptions to its otherwise broad grant of

8

immunity under CDA § 230, Plaintiff has not alleged facts that would qualify for this limited

9

statutory exception. In 2018, Congress passed the Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act (“FOSTA”) to

10

combat several notorious websites that were designed to promote prostitution and facilitate sex

11

trafficking. FOSTA created a narrow exception to CDA § 230 immunity that permits claims civil

12

claims under 18 U.S.C. § 1595 (“Section 1595”) where the interactive computer service violates

13

18 U.S.C. § 1591 (“Section 1591”), by “knowingly . . . benefiting . . . from participation in a [sex

14

trafficking] venture.” 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(2). The language of the exception was carefully targeted

15

to remove immunity for the few criminal websites that, unlike Twitter here, were deliberately and

16

knowingly profiting from reprehensible crimes. FOSTA’s language, its legislative history, and the

17

pre-existing case law on Section 1591 all point to the same conclusion: civil claims can only

18

proceed against knowing and affirmative participants in a sex trafficking venture. Congress never

19

intended for online platforms like Twitter that take action against such activity to be sued for their

20

mere failure to remove content.

21

The Complaint does not come close to meeting this specific and exacting criminal standard.

22

It does not allege any facts suggesting that Twitter knowingly participated in any kind of venture

23

with the Perpetrators, let alone a sex trafficking (i.e., commercial sex) venture.

24

Complaint alleges that Plaintiff reported the Videos to Twitter, it does not allege, as required to

25

establish a violation of Section 1591, any facts establishing that Twitter knew that he was a victim

26

of sex trafficking or that the Videos were evidence of this crime. Nor does the Complaint allege

27

any connection between the Perpetrators and Twitter. And, most importantly, Twitter did remove

While the

28
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1

the Videos and suspended the accounts that had posted them. 1 The fact that nine days transpired

2

before the offending content was taken down does not make Twitter liable under any applicable

3

law. Accordingly, as the Complaint cannot show that Twitter violated Section 1591, it is immune

4

from all Plaintiff’s claims under CDA § 230. And, even if Twitter was not immune under CDA §

5

230, the Complaint contains a number of other significant pleading deficiencies that mandate

6

dismissal. Accordingly, Twitter respectfully asks this Court to dismiss the Complaint with

7

prejudice.

8

II.

9

A.

10

CDA § 230
1.

11

Under CDA § 230, internet platforms are immune from suit based on
the failure to remove offensive third-party content.

12

Congress enacted CDA § 230 to ensure that interactive computer service providers would

13

never have to choose “between taking responsibility for all messages and deleting no messages at

14

all,” which presents such providers a “grim” and illusory choice. Fair Hous. Council of San

15

Fernando Valley v. Roommates.Com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1162–63 (9th Cir. 2008); 47 U.S.C.

16

§ 230(b)(4). To that end, CDA § 230 creates broad immunity for claims against online service

17

providers based on content created by users: “No provider . . . of an interactive computer service

18

shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information

19

content provider.” Id. at § 230(c)(1). In other words, CDA § 230 bars all causes of action that seek

20

to hold service providers like Twitter liable for not removing content created by a third-party. Zeran

21

v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330–31 (4th Cir. 1997); Igbonwa v. Facebook, Inc., 2018 WL

22

4907632, at *5-7 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2018) (Spero, J.), aff’d, 786 F. App’x 104 (9th Cir. 2019).

23

Congress also expressly preempted all state laws that are inconsistent with this immunity. 47

24

U.S.C. § 230(e)(3). This broad immunity assures service providers that they can self-police their

25

platform without fear that failing to remove offensive content would cripple their business with

26

overwhelming liability. See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331; Roommates.Com, 521 F.3d at 1162-63 (9th

27
28
COOLEY LLP

BACKGROUND

1

Twitter understands that the fact that anyone is able to view this type of material for any length
of time can impact victims of the type of crimes at issue here. Twitter agrees that the Perpetrators
should be held accountable for their crimes involving Plaintiff.
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1
2
3

Cir. 2008).
2.

FOSTA creates a very limited exception to Section 230’s broad grant of
immunity in specific cases of criminal misconduct.

4

In 2018, Congress enacted FOSTA in response to reports regarding the proliferation of

5

online prostitution and sex trafficking operations allegedly using CDA § 230 to shield themselves

6

from liability for their misconduct. Pub. L. No. 115-164, 132 Stat. 1253. Congress found that a

7

small but growing number of malicious websites were deliberately facilitating sex trafficking on

8

their sites. See H.R. Rep. No. 115-572, pt. 1, at 3–5 (2018) (“[O]nline classified sites like

9

Backpage.com, Eros, [and] Massage Troll…have gone beyond merely hosting advertisements, []

10

and have purposely created platforms designed to facilitate prostitution and sex trafficking”). Most

11

infamously, the site known as Backpage “had knowingly concealed evidence of criminality by

12

systematically editing its ‘Adult’ ads [by] automatically delet[ing] incriminating words [and] then

13

manually delet[ing] incriminating language that filters missed.” Id. Worse still, Backpage’s

14

business model relied almost entirely on advertisements “designed to sell children for sex.” See

15

164 Cong. Rec. S1849–08, S1852–59 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 2018).

16

To prevent sites like Backpage from misusing CDA § 230’s broad grant of immunity,

17

FOSTA created a very narrow exception: CDA § 230 was amended to permit suit under 18 U.S.C.

18

§ 1595, which creates a private right of action for victims of sex trafficking, but only “if the conduct

19

underlying the claim constitutes a violation of [S]ection 1591,” which is the underlying criminal

20

statute prohibiting sex trafficking. 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(5)(A); Kik Interactive, 482 F. Supp. 3d at

21

1251 (“FOSTA permits civil liability for websites only if the conduct underlying the claim

22

constitutes a violation of section 1591.”). This limitation is important as Section 1591 has more

23

stringent mens rea and required elements to meet than Section 1595. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1591

24

(prohibiting “knowingly… benefit[ting], financially or by receiving anything of value” while

25

“knowingly assisting, supporting, or facilitating” a sex trafficking venture) with 18 U.S.C. § 1595

26

(applying to “whoever knowingly benefits, financially or by receiving anything of value from

27

participation in a venture which that person knew or should have known has engaged in an act in

28
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1

violation of this chapter”). 2 The FOSTA exception therefore only applies to sex traffickers and

2

those who “knowingly. . . benefit[], financially or by receiving anything of value, from participation

3

in a venture which has engaged in [sex trafficking],” 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1)–(2), and only limits

4

CDA § 230 immunity for those websites that knowingly assist or facilitate a sex trafficking venture

5

on their platforms, 3 and does not otherwise change the existing CDA § 230 framework. See Kik

6

Interactive, 482 F. Supp. 3d at 1249–51.

7

The legislative record is clear that Congress intended to revoke immunity only in extreme

8

cases (like Backpage) where the online platform knowingly and affirmatively facilitated sex

9

trafficking. 164 Cong. Rec., at S1860–62 (statement of Senator Durbin (“[FOSTA] is a narrowly

10

crafted bill that would ensure that Section 230 . . . does not provide legal immunity to websites like

11

Backpage”); id. (statement of Senator Schumer (“Key to my support is my understanding that this

12

legislation would not allow nuisance lawsuits against technology companies.”)).

13

Congress made it clear that, “general knowledge that sex trafficking occurs on a website will not

14

suffice as the knowledge element must be proven as to a specific victim.” See H.R. Rep. No. 115-

15

572, at 5. Moreover, immunity would be lost only where “the website operators knew that the

16

[posts] involved sex trafficking.” Id.; see also 164 Cong. Rec., at S1853 (statement of the United

17

States Department of Justice (the “DOJ”) (“Under current [Section 1591] law prosecutors must

18

prove that the defendant knowingly benefitted from participation in a sex trafficking venture, knew

19

that the [post] related to commercial sex, and knew that the [post] involved a minor.”).

Crucially,

20

B.

21

Twitter operates a global communications platform that allows hundreds of millions of

22

people around the world to join an open conversation where users view and share content about

23

events both global and local. (¶¶ 20–26.) People primarily engage on the platform by reading and

Twitter’s Commitment to Fight CSE and Sex Trafficking

24
25
26
27
28
COOLEY LLP

2

All “¶” references are to Plaintiff’s Complaint, ECF No. 1 (the “Complaint”), and all “Wong
Decl.” references are to the Declaration of Kyle C. Wong in Support of Defendant Twitter, Inc.’s
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint filed herewith. Unless otherwise noted, all emphasis is
added, and internal quotation marks and citations are omitted.
3
Section 1595, on the other hand, creates civil liability (outside of the CDA § 230 context), for
those who know or should have known that they were participating in a sex trafficking venture.
FOSTA, which contains no “should have known” language, in comparison narrows the range of
permissible suits against interactive computer services.
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1

posting “Tweets,” which are short messages, that can be reposted or “retweeted.” (¶¶ 23–24.)

2

Users can include hashtagged keywords (#) in their Tweets to facilitate searching for information

3

on the same topic. (See ¶¶ 57–62.) Hundreds of millions of Tweets are posted each day. (¶ 20.)

4

Twitter’s stated purpose is to serve the public conversation—it believes that violence,

5

harassment, and other similar types of behavior discourage people from expressing themselves, and

6

ultimately diminish the value of global public conversation. Accordingly, Twitter has established

7

the Twitter Rules to help ensure that all people can participate in the public conversation freely and

8

safely. (See ¶¶ 38–41, 48–50.) All individuals who sign up for a Twitter account agree to abide by

9

the Twitter Rules and all incorporated policies. Twitter’s Rules unequivocally prohibit CSE

10

material on the platform, stating “[w]e have zero tolerance for child sexual exploitation on

11

Twitter.” 4 (¶ 49; Compl., Ex. A at 1.)

12

This “zero-tolerance” policy identifies sharing any material that “features or promotes” such

13

CSE content as “one of the most serious violations of the Twitter Rules.” (Compl., Ex. A at 1.) To

14

ensure that the over 190 million individuals who use its platform on a daily basis comply with its

15

prohibition against CSE, Twitter employs multiple tools, including reports by the public (a Twitter

16

account is not required to report child sexual exploitation content, Compl., Ex. A at 2), moderators

17

who review reports of abuse and CSE content, innovative technology and algorithms that

18

proactively identify abusive content, and online education and information sharing to combat online

19

abuse. (See ¶¶ 35–41, 48–50; Wong Decl., Exs. 1, 2.) Indeed, in the period from January to June

20

2020 alone, Twitter suspended 438,809 accounts for violating its Rules prohibiting CSE material.

21

91% of those accounts were proactively identified by employing internal proprietary tools and

22

industry hash sharing initiatives. (Wong Decl., Ex. 3.) Twitter is also a member of the Technology

23

Coalition, founded in 2006, which provides funding, advice, and resources to the tech industry on

24

online safety tools for children. (Id. at Ex. 4.) The Coalition recently announced a new initiative,

25

Project Protect, which includes, among other things, “establish[ing] a multi-million dollar research

26

and innovative fund to build crucial technological tools needed to more effectively prevent and

27
28
COOLEY LLP

4

Twitter’s Rules likewise prohibit use of the service for any unlawful purpose or in furtherance of
illegal activities, including human trafficking. (Ex. 8.)
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1
2

C.

3

The Complaint alleges that in 2017, when Plaintiff was a minor, he was tricked into sending

4

nude photos of himself to the Perpetrators using Snapchat, a popular online messaging application.

5

(¶¶ 65–66.) According to the Complaint, the Perpetrators used the photos to blackmail Plaintiff

6

into sending them explicit videos involving himself and a friend. 5 (¶ 68.) Plaintiff subsequently

7

cut off communications with the Perpetrators. (¶¶ 71-73.) The Complaint alleges that one or two

8

years later, on or about January 19 or 20, 2020, Plaintiff learned that the Videos had been posted

9

on Twitter. (¶¶ 74, 78–83.) Plaintiff and his mother Jane Doe reported the Videos to Twitter using

10

Twitter’s reporting process three times beginning on January 21, 2020. (¶¶ 83–95.) Plaintiff and

11

Jane Doe also sent emails about the Videos to Twitter. (Id.) On January 28, 2020, Twitter emailed

12

Plaintiff and informed him that it had reviewed the Videos, and did not find a violation. (¶ 91.)

13

Sometime after, Jane Doe allegedly contacted an agent of the United States Department of

14

Homeland Security (“DHS”), who sent Twitter a takedown request. (¶¶ 97-98.) Immediately after

15

Twitter received the request, on or about January 30, 2020—i.e., nine days after receiving the first

16

report from Plaintiff—Twitter removed the Videos and suspended the Twitter accounts that had

17

posted them. 6 (Id.)

Plaintiff’s Allegations

18

The Complaint contains no allegations that Twitter played any role in the Perpetrators’

19

misconduct. There is no allegation that Twitter was involved in creating the Videos, or that it

20

knowingly provided any assistance to the Perpetrators who tricked Plaintiff into creating the

21

Videos. Indeed, the Complaint alleges that Plaintiff was exploited at least one year before the

22

Videos surfaced on Twitter, and the Complaint contains no facts showing any connection between

23

Twitter and the Perpetrators.

24
25
26
27
28
COOLEY LLP

work to eradicate child sexual exploitation and abuse.” (Id. at Ex. 5.)

The Videos were initially published on a different platform

5

Defendants assume, for the purposes of its Motion to Dismiss only, that this alleged conduct
qualifies as a primary sex trafficking violation. See 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1).
6
While the Complaint implies that Twitter did not suspend the accounts until after January 30,
2020 (¶¶97–98), that is not accurate. The @StraightBross account was banned on January 28, 2020
because of a different report. Twitter also blocked the @BrossStraight account, which appears to
be a reconstitution of the @StraightBross account, one of the accounts that posted the Videos.
(Wong Decl., Ex. 6.) Twitter’s Rules include a prohibition on creating a new account in order to
evade permanent suspension, and, when this activity is detected, Twitter bans accounts that attempt
to circumvent its enforcement actions. (Id. at Ex. 7.)
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1

(Snapchat) and Twitter is not alleged to have taken any affirmative step to disseminate the Videos.

2

No facts are alleged showing that any Twitter employee had actual knowledge that an adult had

3

manipulated Plaintiff into creating the Videos. And, finally, the Complaint does not allege that the

4

Perpetrators were the Twitter users who posted the Videos. There is simply no allegation that

5

Twitter took any affirmative act to facilitate the conduct of the Perpetrators in any way. At most,

6

Plaintiff alleges only that Twitter knew of the Videos themselves, that the Videos violated Twitter’s

7

Rules, and that Twitter failed to take action to remove the Videos when it first became aware of

8

them. But Plaintiff has not asserted—and cannot assert—any non-conclusory allegation that

9

Twitter’s failure to remove the Videos was a knowing and affirmative act to aid a sex trafficking

10

venture, rather than mere error.

11

III.

LEGAL STANDARD

12

A complaint must be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) unless it “contain[s] sufficient factual

13

matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

14

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by

15

mere conclusory statements, do not suffice” to satisfy Rule 8’s pleading requirements. Id. And

16

although the court accepts factual allegations as true, this tenet is “inapplicable to legal

17

conclusions.” Id. When stripped of “conclusory statement[s],” the complaint must do more than

18

“create[] a suspicion of a legally cognizable right of action”; it must “raise a right to relief above

19

the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 561 (2007) (alterations

20

omitted). Otherwise, the complaint must be dismissed. Id.

21

IV.

PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS FAIL AS A MATTER OF LAW

22

A.

23

CDA § 230 shields online service providers like Twitter from liability for lawsuits based on

24

decisions to publish or remove third-party content. The law confers immunity where three elements

25

are met: (1) the defendant is an online service provider; (2) the cause of action treats the defendant

26

as the publisher or speaker of the content in question; and (3) someone other than the defendant

27

provided or created the content at issue in the action. Igbonwa, 2018 WL 4907632, at *5.

28

Consistent with Congress’s intention to broadly protect online platforms from suit, “close cases . .

Twitter Is Immune Under CDA § 230
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1

. must be resolved in favor of immunity.” Jones v. Dirty World Entm’t Recordings LLC, 755 F.3d

2

398, 408 (6th Cir. 2014). Courts regularly dismiss complaints with prejudice when the allegations

3

show that the defendant is immune under CDA § 230. See, e.g., Igbonwa, 2018 WL 4907632, at

4

*7-*8 (dismissing plaintiff’s claims with prejudice); Pennie v. Twitter, Inc., 281 F. Supp. 3d 874,

5

892 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (same) (Spero, J.).
1.

6
7
8

Twitter is an interactive computer service provider.

Twitter is a “provider . . . of an interactive computer service” within the meaning of Section
230(c)(1). See, e.g., Pennie, 281 F. Supp. 3d at 888. The Complaint does not allege otherwise.
2.

9

Plaintiff seeks to hold Twitter liable as the publisher of content supplied
by third parties.

10

There is no question that third parties created the Videos, and posted them to Twitter. (¶¶

11

66–74.) The Complaint does not suggest that Twitter is anything other than an online platform

12

through which third parties can post information. 7 See Igbonwa, 2018 WL 4907632, at *6 (noting

13

that websites that merely provide a “means by which third parties can post information” are not

14

content developers).

15

It is similarly apparent that Plaintiff’s suit seeks to hold Twitter responsible “as the

16

‘publisher or speaker’” of the Videos. See Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1101–03 (9th

17

Cir. 2009) (“[P]ublication involves reviewing, editing, and deciding whether to publish or to

18

withdraw from publication third-party content.”); 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1). All of Plaintiff’s claims

19

are premised on the allegation that Twitter took too long to remove the Videos after Plaintiff

20

reported it. (¶¶ 74–98.) But merely failing to remove third-party content, even if abhorrent, is

21

precisely what CDA § 230 immunizes. Force v. Facebook, Inc., 934 F.3d 53, 65 (2d Cir. 2019)

22
23
24
25
26
27
28
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7

The Complaint declares, based solely “on information and belief,” that “Twitter selectively
removes or prevents” some content that violates its policies while allowing other such content to
remain. (¶ 43.) But “[c]onclusory allegation such as these are insufficient to state a claim against
[Twitter].” See Blantz v. California Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., Div. of Corr. Health Care Servs.,
727 F.3d 917, 926–27 (9th Cir. 2013) (rejecting plaintiff’s bare “information and belief” pleading
as “naked assertions”); Holomaxx Techs. v. Microsoft Corp., 783 F. Supp. 2d 1097, 1105 (N.D.
Cal. 2011) (rejecting as “conclusory” plaintiff’s allegations “based on information and belief”
where plaintiff “offer[ed] no factual support for these allegations”). And, Regardless, “selective”
removal of content would not transform Twitter into an information content provider. Riggs v.
MySpace, Inc., 444 Fed. Appx. 986, 987 (9th Cir. 2011) (claims “arising from MySpace’s decisions
to delete…user profiles on its social networking website yet not delete other profiles…were
precluded by section 230(c)(1) of the Communications Decency Act”).
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1

(“Facebook’s alleged failure to delete content from Hamas members’ Facebook pages” falls “within

2

the heartland of what it means to be the publisher of information under Section 230(c)(1).”);

3

Roommates.Com, 521 F.3d at 1170–71 (“[A]ny activity that can be boiled down to deciding

4

whether to exclude material that third parties seek to post online is perforce immune

5

under section 230.”). 8 Accordingly, the second and third elements of CDA § 230 immunity are

6

met and this suit is barred.

7

Plaintiff cannot revive his claim by contending that Twitter is a content provider because it

8

gives users a search engine tool, which allows users to search for posts using hashtags, suggests

9

searches to users, and displays search results next to targeted advertisements. (¶¶ 28–31, 57–63.)

10

The Complaint fails to connect these platform tools to the harm suffered by Plaintiff; there are no

11

allegations that, for instance, the megalinks hashtag was used on any post involving the Videos or

12

that searches suggested users to view the Videos. Courts have, moreover, uniformly held that such

13

neutral tools are protected by CDA § 230 immunity.

14

Hashtag Searching. Courts routinely hold that online service providers’ “provision of

15

neutral tools to carry out what may be unlawful or illicit searches” by a user is within the protection

16

afforded to publishers under CDA § 230. E.g., Pennie, 281 F. Supp. 3d at 882; Roommates.Com,

17

521 F.3d at 1169–72. This is the case even where “a particular tool facilitate[s] the expression of

18

information” and the “service provider knows that third parties are using such tools to create illegal

19

content.” Goddard v. Google, Inc., 640 F. Supp. 2d 1193, 1197–98 (N.D. Cal. 2009). Indeed,

20

“absent substantial affirmative conduct on the part of the website creator promoting the use of such

21

tools for unlawful purposes,” the provision of neutral tools “is fully protected by CDA immunity.”

22

Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1174 n.37 (emphasis added). In Goddard, the court concluded that

23

Google’s keyword search tool was neutral where users could choose the keywords they searched,

24
25
26
27
28
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8

Courts regularly dismiss claims based on allegations like Plaintiff’s—i.e., that a service provider
failed to remove certain third party content—as barred by CDA § 230. E.g., Igbonwa, 2018 WL
4907632, at *5–7 (barring claims against Facebook that sought to hold it liable for not removing
defamatory content posted by a third party); Gonzalez v. Google, Inc., 282 F. Supp. 3d 1150, 1164–
71 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (barring claims that sought to hold Google liable for “fail[ing] to do enough to
remove [harmful] content”); Doe v. Bates, 2006 WL 3813758, at *18–20 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 27, 2006)
(barring claims that sought “to hold Defendant liable for its alleged failure to . . . prevent[] the
dissemination of the images”).
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1

and there were no facts suggesting Google “require[d] advertisers to engage in illegal conduct.”

2

640 F. Supp. 2d at 1197–99. So too here. The Complaint is devoid of facts suggesting Twitter

3

promotes or requires the use of hashtag searching for improper purposes. Thus, Plaintiff’s claims

4

as to Twitter’s hashtag searching tool are barred by CDA § 230. See id.

5

Search Suggestions. Similarly, “making recommendations to website users and alerting

6

them to posts are ordinary, neutral functions of social-network websites.” E.g., Dyroff v. Ultimate

7

Software Grp., Inc., 2017 WL 5665670, at *8–10 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 26, 2017) (dismissing

8

complaint), aff’d, 934 F.3d 1093 (9th Cir. 2019). In Dyroff, the plaintiff claimed that Ultimate

9

Software contributed to illegality because it used “machine learning algorithms and tools to collect

10

[and] analyze” user data to “recommend and steer vulnerable users, like [plaintiff’s] son, to forums

11

frequented by drug users and dealers.” 2017 WL 5665670, at *8. The court, however, disagreed

12

because those website functionalities—i.e., “algorithmic recommendations of related groups[]”—

13

were based on “users’ voluntary inputs that create[d] the content on” the website. Id. at *10. Here,

14

Twitter’s alleged search suggestions function in the same manner. The Complaint claims that

15

Twitter makes suggestions based on “what the user enters into Twitter’s search bar” and makes

16

“suggestions for other hashtags that are related to [what the user inputted] and users that use the

17

[same] hashtag.” (See ¶¶ 60–62.) Because nothing in the Complaint indicates that Twitter’s

18

algorithmic search suggestions are based on anything besides user-generated content, any claims

19

based on this functionality are also barred by CDA § 230.

20

Targeted Advertisements. A service provider’s use of a targeted ad algorithm is also

21

protected when there are no facts that would “suggest that [the] ad algorithm is anything but content

22

neutral.” See Gonzalez, 282 F. Supp. 3d at 1168–70. Again, the Complaint makes no allegations

23

that Twitter’s displayed advertisements are based on anything other than “user-defined criteria.”

24

See Roommates.Com, 521 F.3d at 1169 (emphasis original). In fact, the Complaint acknowledges

25

that Twitter displays advertisements based on complicated algorithms that analyze user-generated

26

data. (¶¶ 28–30, 58–62.) 9 Thus, to the extent Plaintiff’s claims are based on Twitter’s use of

27
28
COOLEY LLP

9

E.g., ¶ 28 (“Using our proprietary algorithms and understanding of the interests of each account,
we can deliver Promoted Tweets that are intended to be relevant to a particular account. We enable
our advertisers to target an audience based on an individual account’s interest graph. . . Our
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1

targeted ads, they are squarely within the category of claims barred by CDA § 230. See, e.g.,

2

Pennie, 281 F. Supp. 3d at 890 (concluding that CDA § 230 barred plaintiffs’ claim premised on

3

Twitter’s use of targeted ads that were allegedly “based on what is known about the viewer and

4

what the viewer is looking at”).

5

B.

6

Congress has lifted CDA § 230 immunity only in limited, narrow circumstances, including

7

where the content provider itself violates Section 1591. 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(5)(A); Kik Interactive,

8

482 F. Supp. 3d at 1249–51. Section 1591 punishes (1) primary violators who directly participate

9

in sex trafficking; and (2) secondary participants who “knowingly . . . benefit[], financially or by

10

receiving anything of value, from participation in a venture” with a primary violator. 18 U.S.C. §

11

1591(a). Section 1591 specifically defines “participation in a venture” as “knowingly assisting,

12

supporting, or facilitating [sex trafficking].” Id. at § 1591(e)(4).

13

Plaintiff alleges that Twitter is a secondary participant under Section 1591, which requires

14

Plaintiff to plead that Twitter “knowingly . . . benefit[ed] . . . from participation in a venture which

15

has engaged in [sex trafficking] in violation of [Section 1591(a)(1)].” 18 U.S.C. 1591(a)(2). The

16

statute makes clear that “participation in a venture” means “knowingly assisting, supporting, or

17

facilitating” a primary violation. Id. § 1591(e)(4). Here, the Complaint appears to contend that

18

Twitter “knowingly” participated in a venture with the Perpetrators based on either (i) Twitter’s

19

initial failure to find a violation of its policies after reviewing the Video, or (ii) Twitter’s nine day

20

delay in removing the Videos. (¶¶ 83–98, 102–09.) Regardless of the theory, such conduct does

21

not constitute a violation of Section 1591(a)(2) for three reasons. First, Plaintiff does not allege

22

the existence of any type of venture between Twitter and any party that has a common purpose,

23

much less facts suggesting “that [Twitter] actually participated in a sex-trafficking venture” that

24

had the common purpose of trafficking Plaintiff. United States v. Afyare, 632 F. App’x 272, 283–

25

86 (6th Cir. 2016) (emphasis original); B.M. v. Wyndham Hotels & Resorts, Inc., 2020 WL

26

4368214, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 30, 2020) (analyzing the elements of a Section 1591 violation and

27
28
COOLEY LLP

The Complaint Does Not Allege Any Actionable Exemption to CDA § 230’s
Broad Grant of Immunity

Promoted Tweets include objective-based features that allow advertisers to pay only for [certain]
types of engagement . . . such as Tweet engagements (e.g., Retweets, replies and likes), website
clicks, mobile application installs or engagements, obtaining new followers, or video views.”).
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1

following Afyare). Second, there are no facts indicating Twitter knowingly received a benefit

2

“because of” the alleged sex trafficking venture. Geiss v. Weinstein Co. Holdings LLC, 383 F.

3

Supp. 3d 156, 169 (S.D.N.Y. 2019). Third, the Complaint does not contain any allegation that

4

Twitter had actual knowledge that Plaintiff was a victim of sex trafficking or that it knew the Videos

5

contained evidence of this. (See ¶ 107; Noble v. Weinstein, 335 F. Supp. 3d 504, 523–24 (S.D.N.Y.

6

2018) (quoting Afyare and concluding that a defendant must be aware of the specific primary

7

violation to be liable as a secondary participant under Section 1591).)
1.

8

Twitter did not participate in any type of venture with the Perpetrators.

9

The Complaint fails to plausibly allege (1) the existence of any type of venture between

10

Twitter and the Perpetrators or (2) that Twitter made a single affirmative act to further Plaintiff’s

11

alleged sex trafficking.

12

No Venture. Plaintiff does not allege a single fact to support the existence of a venture

13

between Twitter and the Perpetrators. A “venture” is defined as “any group of two or more

14

individuals associated in fact.” 18 U.S.C. § 1591(e)(6). 10 Courts have interpreted this to mean in

15

the context of Section 1595 claims—which has a lower mens rea standard than Section 1591—that

16

a plaintiff must “at least” allege facts indicating a “continuous [] relationship” between each

17

member of the venture “such that it would appear [they] have established a pattern of conduct or

18

could be said to have a tacit agreement.” See M.A. v. Wyndham Hotels & Resorts, Inc., 425 F.

19

Supp. 3d 959, 970–71 (S.D. Ohio 2019). In M.A., for example, the court found a “venture” because

20

the plaintiff alleged she saw the beneficiary defendant and her trafficker “exchanging high-fives in

21

the motel’s parking lot while speaking about ‘getting this thing going again.’” 425 F. Supp. 3d at

22

970–71. Yet the Complaint does not allege any facts showing a continuous relationship that would

23

establish a pattern of conduct or a tacit agreement between Twitter and any other person. For

24

instance, Plaintiff does not claim that the Perpetrators Tweeted the Videos. (¶ 74 (alleging that the

25

Videos “surfaced” on Twitter).) Nor does he allege that the Perpetrators used Twitter in any way

26
27
28
COOLEY LLP

10

“Associated in fact” is a term of art, and in the context of civil claims premised on violations of
the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, it means a group of people who have
associated together, whether “formally or informally,” for a “common purpose” over a period of
time. Washington v. Deleon, 2019 WL 11691424, at *5–*6 (N.D. Cal. July 9, 2019).
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1

to further their illicit behavior. And, he does not claim that whoever posted the Videos on Twitter

2

knew about or had anything to do with the sex trafficking that led to the creation of the Videos.

3

The absence of any fact connecting Twitter in any way with anyone who knew about the underlying

4

crime—which, again, is the exploitation that resulted in the creation of the Videos—is fatal to

5

Plaintiff’s ability to plead the existence of a venture involving Twitter even under the lower

6

standard of Section 1595. See J.B. v. G6 Hosp., LLC, 2020 WL 4901196, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Aug.

7

20, 2020) (rejecting Section 1595 claim where “there [was] no factual basis pled” that made it

8

plausible that a venture existed between Craigslist and plaintiff’s traffickers). Consequently,

9

Plaintiff has not pleaded the existence of a venture under Section 1591.

10

No Active Participation. A defendant can only be liable as a secondary participant under

11

Section 1591 if they “knowingly assist[], support[], or facilitate[] a [primary] violation.” 18 U.S.C.

12

§ 1591(e)(4). As the Sixth Circuit, in a seminal decision, described:

13

[C]onsider a hypothetical defendant who joins a soccer team with some sex
traffickers, who sponsor the team financially [] using the money they generate from
sex trafficking activities. And assume that the sex traffickers do not conceal the
source of this money from the rest of the team. . . Ignoring the reprehensible
amorality of our hypothetical defendant, who knowingly participates on a soccer
team funded by sex trafficking money, the question is whether Congress
criminalized his conduct in § 1591(a)(2). The district court thought not and. . .
would require that a defendant actually participate and commit some “overt act” that
furthers the sex trafficking aspect of the venture. . . We agree with the district court
and find that § 1591(a)(2) targets those who participate in sex trafficking; it does not
target soccer players who turn a blind eye to the source of their financial
sponsorship.

14
15
16
17
18
19
20

Afyare, 632 F. App’x at 286. Thus, the law does not punish a defendant for participation in a lawful

21

venture with sex traffickers, or knowingly but passively receiving the financial benefits of sex

22

trafficking. Rather, liability arises only when a defendant makes “some overt act that furthers the

23

sex trafficking aspect of the venture.” 11 Afyare, 632 F. App’x at 286; see also Geiss, 383 F. Supp.

24

3d at 169 (“participation” requires “affirmative conduct furthering the sex-trafficking venture”);

25
26
27
28
COOLEY LLP

11

An “overt act” in the conspiracy context “is an act by one or more of the members of the
conspiracy that is done to help accomplish the agreed upon crime. The overt act must happen after
the defendant has agreed to commit the crime.” Lunsford v. Hornbeak, 2014 WL 4243772, at *10
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 2014), aff’d, 665 F. App’x 563 (9th Cir. 2016); see Afyare, 632 F. App’x at
283–84 (analyzing “participation in a venture” by “rel[ying] on the general concept of a ‘venture’
in a conspiracy”).
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1

Kik Interactive, 482 F. Supp. 3d at 1251 (Section 1591 “requires . . . active participation in sex

2

trafficking”); Noble, 335 F. Supp. 3d at 524 (“Because guilt, or in this case liability, cannot be

3

established by association alone, Plaintiff must allege specific conduct that furthered the sex

4

trafficking venture”); Doe 3 v. Red Roof Inns, Inc., 2020 WL 1872333, at *3 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 13,

5

2020) (“[K]nowledge and some participation in the sex trafficking act itself must be shown.”).

6

The Complaint does not allege any facts suggesting that Twitter actively participated in

7

Plaintiff’s alleged exploitation or took any overt act to further it. The only parties alleged to have

8

affirmatively participated in Plaintiff’s alleged sex trafficking are the Perpetrators. (¶¶ 65–72.)

9

Twitter was not involved in creating the Videos; indeed, Plaintiff concedes the Videos were created

10

years earlier on an entirely different platform. (¶¶ 65–74.) There is no allegation that Twitter took

11

any affirmative acts to disseminate the Videos. Nor is there any allegation that Twitter helped to

12

develop or create the Tweet that included the Videos. Plaintiff’s claim against Twitter is based

13

solely on Twitter’s alleged failure to remove those Videos. (E.g., ¶ 76 (alleging that Twitter “did

14

not take action against the @StraightBross account”); see also ¶¶ 83–88, 90, 93–96.) Indeed,

15

Plaintiff repeatedly faults Twitter for not doing enough to remove abusive content on its platform

16

and prevent the use of its neutral search tools for illegal purposes. (¶¶ 35–43, 48–63.) But such

17

“negative acquiescence” does not, as a matter of law, constitute a violation of Section 1591. Afyare,

18

632 F. App’x at 286 (noting that to find otherwise would “create a vehicle to ensnare conduct that

19

the statute never contemplated”); cf. David v. Weinstein Co. LLC, 431 F. Supp. 3d 290, 307

20

(S.D.N.Y. 2019) (concluding that allegations that defendant “failed to act to prevent harm” were

21

“insufficient to show that [defendant] engaged in any affirmative act”).

22

2.

23

Twitter did not knowingly receive any benefits because of a sex
trafficking venture.

24

Section 1591 also requires “a causal relationship between affirmative conduct furthering

25

the sex-trafficking venture and receipt of a benefit, with actual . . . knowledge of that causal

26

relationship”. Geiss, 383 F. Supp. 3d at 169); Kolbek v. Twenty First Century Holiness Tabernacle

27

Church, Inc., 2013 WL 6816174, at *16 (W.D. Ark. Dec. 24, 2013). The Complaint fails to make

28

this requisite showing.
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1

No benefit. There is no factual allegation that Twitter monetized or benefited from the

2

Videos. The Complaint does not allege that Twitter promoted the Tweet containing the Videos,

3

posted ads next to the Videos, or licensed any data related to the Videos. In fact, the Complaint

4

makes no effort to connect any of the allegations regarding Twitter’s revenue streams to the Videos.

5

Instead, the Complaint assumes that Twitter must have monetized the Videos and thereby received

6

benefits from Plaintiff’s alleged sex trafficking venture because Twitter monetizes all the content

7

on its platform. (¶¶ 46-47.)

8

unsupported (and untrue). For instance, while the Complaint acknowledges that Twitter “monetizes

9

its platform by selling advertisements and data licensing,” and purports to describe how it works

10

(¶¶ 27–34), 12 none of those details indicates Twitter monetizes every Tweet on its platform, let

11

alone the specific Tweets with the Videos. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557 (“[N]aked assertion[s] .

12

. . without some further factual enhancement [] stops short of the line between possibility and

13

plausibility.”). As such, the Complaint’s vague and conclusory implication that Twitter monetizes

14

all content and therefore must have monetized the Videos fails to show Twitter received any benefit.

15

See Jabagat v. Lombardi, 2015 WL 11004900, at *4 (S.D. Miss. Jan. 30, 2015) (“conclusory

16

allegation[] that Defendants knowingly benefited financially” was a “mere recitation of the

17

elements of the cause of action” and was “insufficient”).
No Causal Connection.

18

These conclusory and speculative allegations, however, are

The Complaint also fails to plausibly allege that Twitter

19

knowingly generated revenue “because of” its alleged failure to remove the Videos. See Geiss, 383

20

F. Supp. 3d at 169–70 (emphasis original) (dismissing complaint because plaintiff failed to allege

21

a direct causal connection between the defendants’ conduct and their receipt of benefits). In Geiss,

22

the court acknowledged that defendant TWC undoubtedly received benefits from Harvey

23

Weinstein’s continued employment as his films and influence generated revenue for the company.

24

But the “controlling question” was “whether H[arvey] Weinstein provided any of those benefits to

25

TWC because of [its] facilitation of [his] sexual misconduct.” Id. (dismissing Section 1591 claim

26

because the “FAC pleads no facts that would plausibly support such a conclusion”).

27
28
COOLEY LLP

12

Plaintiff mischaracterizes how Twitter monetizes its platform, but Twitter will not dispute these
alleged facts for the purposes of its Motion to Dismiss.
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1

The Complaint here merely references Twitter’s advertising and data licensing revenues; it

2

does not allege a single fact to establish any causal link between either of those revenue streams

3

and Twitter’s handling of the Videos, much less that Twitter was aware of that link. (¶¶ 27–34,

4

45–47, 58; Geiss, 383 F. Supp. 3d at 169 (Section 1591 violation requires the defendant to have

5

“actual . . . knowledge of that causal relationship”).) The Complaint does not allege, for example,

6

that Twitter knew that the Videos were related to sex trafficking and placed them next to

7

advertisements or allowed them to become a promoted Tweet. Nor does it allege that the Videos

8

showed up in any search results next to promoted texts or ads. Likewise, there is no allegation

9

establishing a causal link between the Videos and any of its data licensing revenue. See Kolbek,

10

2013 WL 6816174, at *16 (dismissing Section 1591 claim where plaintiffs “offer no evidence of a

11

causal relationship between the sex [trafficking] and the [benefits]”). Plaintiff thus fails to allege

12

that Twitter knowingly benefitted from Plaintiff’s alleged sex trafficking as Section 1591 requires.

13

3.

Twitter did not know of the alleged sex trafficking.

14

In enacting FOSTA, Congress acknowledged that the mens rea requirement of Section 1591

15

is “difficult to prove” when it comes to online service providers. H.R. Rep. No. 115-572, pt. 1, at

16

3–6. This is because Section 1591 expressly requires a defendant to “knowingly assist[], support[],

17

or facilitat[e]” a violation of Section 1591(a)(1), which criminalizes the exploitation of people for

18

commercial sex. 18 U.S.C. §1591(e)(4). Thus, Plaintiff must show that Twitter knew specifically

19

that Plaintiff had been sex trafficked, and deliberately assisted the sex trafficking. Kik Interactive,

20

482 F. Supp. 3d at 1251 (dismissing claim where plaintiff did not allege “facts that would plausibly

21

establish that Defendants knowingly participated in the sex trafficking venture involving her.”).

22

The Complaint, however, contains no facts plausibly alleging that Twitter had actual

23

knowledge of Plaintiff’s prior interactions with the Perpetrators. While Plaintiff and Jane Doe

24

reported the Videos to Twitter through its platform’s reporting process (¶¶ 83-84, 86–88), there is

25

no allegation that any of these submissions informed Twitter that Plaintiff was a victim of sex

26

trafficking. See Noble, 335 F. Supp. 3d at 524 (dismissing Section 1591(a)(2) claim because there

27

were no “specific factual allegations that plausibly allege [defendant] knew of [primary violator’s]

28

alleged violation of Section 1591 in Cannes”); Lawson v. Rubin, 2018 WL 2012869, at *13–14
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1

(E.D.N.Y. Apr. 29, 2018) (dismissing Section 1591(a) claim because the complaint did “not allege

2

that [defendant] was present for any of the alleged assaults, was told about them before or after

3

they occurred, or knew that any of the plaintiffs were afraid of the [trafficker]”). Nor is there any

4

allegation that the Videos would have, on their face, indicated to Twitter (or a reasonable viewer)

5

that Plaintiff had been trafficked and the Videos involved commercial sex. (See ¶ 85 (alleging only

6

that the Videos depicted Plaintiff and another teenager).)

7

To be sure, Plaintiff alleges that he and Jane Doe wrote emails to Twitter stating that

8

Plaintiff had been “harass[ed] and [] threatened” (¶ 85), “a victim in a sex abuse situation” (¶ 90),

9

and “baited, harassed, and threatened” (¶ 94). But none of those emails stated that Plaintiff was a

10

victim of sex trafficking or indicated that the Videos related to commercial sex. 13 A.B. v. Hilton

11

Worldwide Holdings Inc., 2020 WL 5371459, at *11 (D. Or. Sept. 8, 2020) (“The TVPRA targets

12

commercial sex activity where children are victimized.”); 164 Cong. Rec., at S1853 (statement of

13

the DOJ (“Under current [Section 1591] law prosecutors must prove that the defendant . . . knew

14

that the [post] related to commercial sex, and knew that the advertisement involved a minor.”). 14

15

Because “there are no facts in the [Complaint] supporting an inference of the mens rea

16

standard necessary to peel back Section 230’s protections,” Plaintiff’s claim against Twitter must

17

fail. Woodhull Freedom Found. v. United States, 334 F. Supp. 3d 185, 203 (D.D.C. 2018), rev’d

18

on other grounds, 948 F.3d 363 (D.C. Cir. 2020). 15

19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
COOLEY LLP

C.

The Complaint Does Not State a Claim Under Section 1595.

13

“The term ‘commercial sex act’ means any sex act, on account of which anything of value is
given to or received by any person.” 18 U.S.C. 1591(e)(3).
14
The Complaint also lacks factual allegations suggesting that any Twitter employee saw those
emails. (See ¶ 108.) Plaintiff and Jane Doe concede that Twitter only responded to the reports they
submitted through Twitter’s platform; there is no allegation that Twitter acknowledged or provided
a response to the emails. (¶¶ 50, 83–84, 86–88, 90–91, 94–95.) See J.L. v. Best W. Int'l, Inc., 2021
WL 719853, at *14 (D. Colo. Feb. 24, 2021) (plaintiff did not allege that defendants had actual
knowledge of her sex trafficking where she did “not allege that any member of the hotel staff heard
and ignored her pleas [for help]”).
15
To the extent Plaintiff relies on allegations regarding Twitter’s general knowledge that sex
trafficking occurs on its platform, that is also unavailing. Kik Interactive, 482 F. Supp. 3d at 1251
(allegation “that Defendants knew that other sex trafficking incidents occurred on Kik. . . does not
satisfy FOSTA’s requirement that the conduct underlying the claim violate 18 U.S.C. § 1591”);
A.B., 2020 WL 5371459, at *8–9 (allegations that defendants “knew or should have known of
Plaintiff’s trafficking because [they] were generally aware of trafficking occurring at their branded
properties” was insufficient). Furthermore, Twitter takes active steps against sex trafficking. (¶¶
48–50; Exs. 1, 2, 3, 5.)
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1

Even if Twitter was not immune under CDA § 230 for alleged violations of 18 U.S.C.

2

§ 1595 (it is), that claim should still be dismissed for failing to plead all elements required by the

3

statute. A victim of sex trafficking may sue either the primary “perpetrator” or a “benefi[ciary]” of

4

sex trafficking. 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a). Under the “beneficiary” theory, a plaintiff must allege: (1)

5

the defendant “knowingly” benefitted, financially or “by receiving anything of value”; (2) from

6

“participat[ing] in a venture”; (3) that the “person [or entity] knew or should have known has

7

engaged in an act in violation of this chapter.” M.A. v., 425 F. Supp. 3d at 964. Plaintiff fails to

8

allege either that Twitter “participated in a venture” with the Perpetrators, or that Twitter “should

9

have known” of Plaintiff’s alleged sex trafficking.

10

Twitter did not participate in a venture with the Perpetrators.

11

Twitter did not associate in any way with the Perpetrators, much less participate in a venture

12

with them. Under a “beneficiary” theory, a plaintiff bringing a Section 1595 claim must show that

13

the defendant “participat[ed] in a venture. . . [that] engaged in an act in violation of this chapter.”

14

18 U.S.C. § 1595(a). “In the absence of a direct association” between the primary violators and the

15

beneficiary, the plaintiff must “at least” allege facts indicating a “continuous [] relationship”

16

between each member of the venture “such that it would appear [they] have established a pattern

17

of conduct or could be said to have a tacit agreement.” See M.A., 425 F. Supp. 3d at 970–71. As

18

previously discussed, there are no facts indicating that Twitter had any kind of relationship or

19

contact with the Perpetrators that comes close to anything that might resemble a “continuous

20

relationship” or “tacit agreement” with them. (See supra at 13–14.) Instead, the Complaint implies

21

that Twitter enters into tacit agreements with all sex traffickers who use its platform. (¶¶ 45–63.)

22

Such an allegation, however, would not be “reasonable in light of the volume of posts generated by

23

third parties daily” on Twitter’s platform. See J.B., 2020 WL 4901196, at *9 (allegation that

24

“Craigslist enters into tacit agreements with all traffickers (or even all posters) that use its website”

25

was insufficient—“Plaintiff must allege facts supporting the inference that Craigslist made a tacit

26

agreement with the sex traffickers who victimized Plaintiff.”). 16

27
28
COOLEY LLP

1.

16

This would also be an unreasonable conclusion in light of Twitter’s public representations that it
took action against over 400,000 accounts that had violated Twitter’s rules prohibiting CSE
material during the first six months of 2020. (Ex. 3.)
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1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

2.

There are no facts suggesting Twitter should have known of Plaintiff’s
alleged sex trafficking.

As with their failure to plead Twitter’s knowledge as required under Section 1591, Plaintiff
likewise cannot state a Section 1595 claim because the facts pled fail to satisfy even Section 1595’s
lower “should have known” standard. While constructive knowledge is sufficient under Section
1595 (in contrast with Section 1591), a plaintiff still must allege facts showing the defendant should
have known about what specifically happened to the plaintiff. M.A., 425 F. Supp. 3d at 968; A.B.
v. Marriott Int'l, Inc., 455 F. Supp. 3d 171, 189–91 (E.D. Pa. 2020). Although the Complaint alleges
that Plaintiff and Jane Doe provided some details about what happened between Plaintiff and the
Perpetrators (e.g., ¶ 85 (stating that Plaintiff had been “harass[ed] and [] threatened”); ¶¶ 90, 94),
those allegations are far less clear than the allegations courts have previously found to meet Section
1595’s constructive knowledge standard.
In A.B., for example, the plaintiff defeated a motion to dismiss because she alleged facts
that put the hotel on notice that she was a victim of sex trafficking. Id. at 189–91 (among other
warning signs were (1) a “constant stream of male visitors” to her room; (2) the rooms “were littered
with multiple broken objects, used condoms, and other sex paraphernalia”; (3) hotel staff “observed
A.B. with signs of visible injury on more than on occasion”; and (4) “attacks on A.B. by her
trafficker were constant and loud enough for hotel patrons and staff to hear”). Similarly, in M.A.,
the plaintiff stated a Section 1595 claim because she alleged, among other things, that (1) she was
“routinely escorted by her trafficker in view of the front desk after her trafficker paid in cash for
the reserved room,” (2) “hotel staff ignored her” “desperate pleas and screams for help” when she
was “being beaten or choked” at the hotel properties, (3) the “trafficker[s] often request rooms near
exit doors,” and (4) the trash cans in plaintiff’s rooms were “[f]requently” full of “an extraordinary
number of used condoms.” 425 F. Supp. 3d at 967.
Here, as with the alleged Section 1591 violation, there is no factual allegation to support
that Twitter “should have known” that the Video involved sex trafficking conduct—i.e., the
exploitation of children for commercial sex purposes. (See supra at 17-18.) There is no allegation
that those viewing the Videos would perceive that they depicted commercial sex acts involving
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1

post-pubescent minors. (Id.) And none of the reports or emails sent to Twitter about the Videos

2

indicated that Plaintiff had been sex trafficked or that they involved commercial sex acts. (Id.) To

3

the extent Plaintiff relies on allegations that Twitter was generally aware that sex trafficking

4

occurred on its platform, they also fail to establish Twitter’s constructive knowledge that the Videos

5

involved sex trafficking. (See supra at 18 n.15). Last, the mere passage of nine days between the

6

offending Tweet and the content takedown is not enough to show that Twitter “should have

7

known.” Such a delay in removing the content says nothing about what Twitter did or did not know

8

about the content of the Videos. Without specific facts that would “have alerted [Twitter] to

9

[Plaintiff’s] situation,” the Complaint cannot state a Section 1595 claim. See M.A., 425 F. Supp.

10

3d at 968.

11

D.

12

Plaintiff’s remaining claims are barred by CDA § 230. Every court that has analyzed

13

whether FOSTA limited immunity for claims other than claims under Section 1595 have found that

14

“FOSTA removes CDA immunity only for claims under [S]ection 1595.” E.g., Kik Interactive,

15

482 F. Supp. 3d at 1249.

Plaintiff’s Remaining Claims are barred by CDA § 230.

16

2020 WL 6434845, at *9–10 (“[B]ecause Congress limited 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(5)(A) to

17

federal causes of action under 18 U.S.C. § 1595, the presumption is that Congress intentionally

18

excluded state law claims from this provision.”). Consequently, the rest of Plaintiff’s claims remain

19

barred by CDA § 230. See Doe v. Bates, 2006 WL 3813758, at *18–20 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 27, 2006)

20

(concluding CDA §230 barred plaintiff’s Section 2252A claim); Cal. Civ. Code § 1708.85(h)

21

(“[n]othing in this section shall be construed to alter or negate any rights, obligations, or immunities

22

of an interactive service provider under Section 230 of Title 47 of the United States Code.”); J.B.,

23

2020 WL 4901196, at *7 (negligence and negligence per se); Riggs v. MySpace, Inc., 2009 WL

24

10671689, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2009), reversed in part on other grounds, 444 Fed. Appx. 986

25

(9th Cir. 2011) (gross negligence); Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1125 (9th

26

Cir. 2003) (invasion of privacy); Caraccioli v. Facebook, Inc., 700 Fed. Appx. 588, 590 (9th Cir.

27

2017) (public disclosure of private facts and intrusion upon seclusion); Doe II v. MySpace Inc., 175

28

Cal. App. 4th 561, 575 (2009) (product liability).
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1
2

E.

Even if not barred by the CDA, Plaintiff’s claims fail.
1.

Plaintiff fails to state a claim under 18 U.S.C. § 2258A.

3

Plaintiff seeks to bring a claim under 18 U.S.C. § 2258A (Count II), but that criminal statute

4

does not provide a private cause of action. Id.; Abcarian v. Levine, 972 F.3d 1019, 1026 (9th Cir.

5

2020) (“[I]f the statutory language itself does not display an intent to create a private remedy, then

6

a cause of action does not exist and courts may not create one.” (emphasis original)).

7

2.

Plaintiff fails to state a California products liability claim.

8

Plaintiff’s products liability claim must be dismissed because Plaintiff fails to allege he

9

suffered physical injury or property damage resulting from his use of a defective product. See

10

Hernandez v. Avis Budget Grp., Inc., 2017 WL 6406838, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2017) (To state

11

products liability claim, Plaintiff must allege “factual allegations regarding any physical injuries or

12

property damage he sustained.”) Plaintiff alleges only that he “was harmed by these defects in

13

Twitter’s products.”

14

(“conclusory statement” that Plaintiff “has suffered personal injury”).

(¶ 139.)

This is insufficient.

Hernandez, 2017 WL 6406838, at *5

15

Moreover, Plaintiff fails to clearly identify any product that is allegedly defective. Plaintiff,

16

for instance, alleges that “Twitter created its platform, API, and related products, and distributes

17

them and has placed these products into commerce.” (¶ 128.) Plaintiff then alleges that “due to

18

the structure of the platform, including Twitter’s capacity to monitor, block, or delete content on

19

the platform, the product in question never left Twitter’s possession.” (¶ 133.) It is unclear

20

whether Plaintiff is alleging that one “product” or multiple “products” are defective, and whether

21

the “product in question” is Twitter itself, Twitter’s software, other “related products,” the Videos

22

themselves or some combination thereof. (Compare ¶ 136 (“Twitter’s products are defective) with

23

¶ 137 (“Twitter is a product . . .).) Because Plaintiff fails to clearly identify any product that caused

24

him injury, the claim should be dismissed. See Griff v. Woejeckloski, 2017 WL 8185857, at *3

25

(C.D. Cal. March 20, 2017) (dismissing products liability claim where plaintiff failed to “allege

26

that any product (for example, the handrail) is defective” and where defendant was primarily

27

providing a service, rather than a product).

28

If Plaintiff is attempting to allege that the design of the Twitter platform itself is defective,
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1

this claim still fails. To bring a defective design claim, Plaintiff must allege that: (1) Twitter

2

manufactured, distributed, or sold a product; (2) the product did not perform as safely as an ordinary

3

consumer would have expected it to perform when used or misused in an intended or reasonably

4

foreseeable way; and (3) Plaintiff was injured by the product and the product’s failure to perform

5

safely was a substantial factor in causing Plaintiff’s harm. See Soule v. Gen. Motors Corp., 8 Cal.

6

4th 548, 560 (1994). As an initial matter, the “language” and “purposes served” by products

7

liability is “geared to the tangible world,” not the intangible world of internet platforms that operate

8

to provide a space for the exchange of thoughts, communications, and expression. Winter v. G.P.

9

Putnam’s Sons, 938 F.2d 1033, 1034-35 (9th Cir. 1991) (harm resulting from ideas and expressions

10

in a book do not give rise to products liability claim); Intellect Art Multimedia Inc. v. Milewski, 899

11

N.Y.S.2d 60, at *7 (2009) (dismissing products liability claim because court “not persuaded that

12

this website” is a “product”). Rather, “[t]he basis of strict liability is the furnishing of defective

13

goods.” Brooks v. Eugene Burger Management Corp., 215 Cal. App. 3d 1611, 1624-25 (1989)

14

(apartment complex design that lacked a fence was not a good for purposes of products liability);

15

see also Wilson v. Midway Games, Inc., 198 F. Supp. 2d 167, 172–73 (D. Conn. 2002) (interactive

16

video game not product for products liability and collecting cases); James v. Meow Media, Inc., 90

17

F.Supp.2d 798, 810 (W.D.Ky.2000) (“intangible thoughts, ideas and messages contained within

18

games, movies, and website materials are not products for the purposes of strict products liability”).

19

3.

Plaintiff fails to state a claim under any negligence theory.

20

In Counts V-VII, Plaintiff purports to bring four species of negligence claims—negligence,

21

gross negligence, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and negligence per se. None are viable.

22

First, Plaintiff’s claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress and negligence per se

23

must be dismissed because they are not independent causes of action under California law. See

24

Sinclair for Tucker v. Twitter, Inc., 2019 WL 10252752, at *7 (N.D. Cal. March 20, 2019)

25

(“[negligent infliction of emotion distress] is not an independent claim, but is simply a claim of

26

negligence); J.B., 2020 WL 4901196, at *11 (concluding “negligence per se is not a separate cause

27

of action”). Second, Plaintiff’s remaining negligence claims both fail because Plaintiff has not

28

alleged that Twitter owed him any legal duty. “To state a claim for negligence, Plaintiff must plead
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1

(1) a duty owed by Twitter, (2) a breach of that duty, (3) causation, and (4) damages.” Worldwide

2

Media, Inc. v. Twitter, Inc., 2018 WL 5304852, at *8–9 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 24, 2018). 17 But the

3

Complaint contains no facts suggesting Twitter owed Plaintiff a legally cognizable duty. To be

4

sure, Plaintiff contends “Twitter had a duty to protect” him because it had “actual knowledge” of

5

the Videos and failed to take it down. (¶ 143; see also ¶¶ 83, 97, 143-44.) But where a defendant

6

“merely fails to take affirmative action, [the] defendant is not liable [in negligence] absent a special

7

relationship” with the plaintiff. AF Holdings, LLC v. Doe, 2012 WL 4747170, at *5 (N.D. Cal.

8

Oct. 3, 2012) (dismissing negligence claim alleging nonfeasance where no special relationship

9

existed with plaintiff); Dyroff, 934 F.3d at 1101 (concluding that “nonfeasance” does not “create[]

10

an ordinary duty of care where none may have existed before”). Plaintiff does not allege any facts

11

from which the Court could conclude that a special relationship existed between Twitter and

12

Plaintiff. In fact, Plaintiff does not even allege that he is a Twitter user. And, even if he were a

13

user, courts routinely decline to find special relationships between users and websites. E.g., Dyroff,

14

934 F.3d at 1101 (“No website could function if a duty of care was created when a website

15

facilitates communication, in a content-neutral fashion, of its users’ content.”); Doe v. MySpace,

16

474 F. Supp. 2d 843, 846, 852 (W.D. Tex. 2007) (dismissing negligence claims because Myspace

17

did not owe a legal duty to parents of a teenager who was raped to protect their daughter from

18

criminal acts “nor to institute reasonable safety measures on its website”).

19

4.

Plaintiff fails to state a claim under Cal. Civ. Code § 1708.85.

20

In Count IX, Plaintiff alleges Twitter violated California Civil Code section 1708.85, which

21

creates a private right of action against a person “who intentionally distributes” private sexually

22

explicit materials “without [Plaintiff’s] consent” if, among other things “the person knew that the

23

other person had a reasonable expectation that the material would remain private.” § 1708.85(a).

24

However, the statute expressly precludes liability if “[t]he distributed material was previously

25

distributed by another person.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1708.85(c)(6).

26

The Complaint alleges no facts from which the Court could infer that Twitter “intentionally

27
28
COOLEY LLP
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1

distribute[d]” the Videos; rather, it makes a conclusory allegation that “[b]y refusing to remove or

2

block [the Videos], Twitter intentionally distributed” them. (¶ 163.) This is insufficient to state a

3

cause of action. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,

4

supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice” to satisfy Rule 8). The plain language of

5

the statute also precludes liability here. Accepting the allegations of the Complaint as true, the

6

Videos were distributed first on an entirely different platform—Snapchat. And, at a minimum, they

7

were previously distributed by two individuals (whom Plaintiff does not allege were the

8

individual(s) who trafficked him) months before Twitter ever became aware of the Videos—

9

@StraightBross and @fitmalesblog.

10

V.

CONCLUSION

11

FOSTA exempts civil claims under Section 1595 from CDA § 230 immunity only where a

12

service provider knowingly and affirmatively assists or facilitates a sex trafficking venture. It does

13

not otherwise change the existing CDA § 230 framework. And here, Plaintiff does not adequately

14

plead that Twitter knowingly and affirmatively participated in any sex trafficking venture.

15

Accordingly, all of Plaintiff's claims are barred by CDA § 230, and for all of the reasons above,

16

this Court should grant the Motion and dismiss the case against Twitter in its entirety, with

17

prejudice.

18
19
20
21
22
23
24

Dated: March 10, 2021
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By: /s/ Michael G. Rhodes
Michael G. Rhodes
Attorneys for Defendant
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